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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1
The Tribal Defenders Network is a group of tribal
advocates, defense attorneys, and federal criminal justice
attorneys who defend American Indians in tribal court
criminal proceedings, and who collaborate generally with
tribal court criminal defense attorneys and advocates.
These amici are concerned about the rights of defendants
who are American Indians appearing in tribal court
criminal proceedings, including their due process rights
in the tribal court setting and in successive federal court
criminal prosecutions.
Professor Barbara L. Creel is an enrolled citizen
of a Federally Recognized Indian Tribe, and a former
Assistant Federal Public Defender, tribal defender, and
state appellate defender. She has practiced in Oregon and
New Mexico as an Indian Legal Services Attorney and
an Assistant Federal Public Defender. She is a tenured
Professor of Law at the University of New Mexico School
of Law, and her area of expertise is the intersection
of criminal law, Indian law and constitutional law. She
teaches courses addressing criminal law and procedure,
including Criminal Law in Indian Country. She is the
Director of the Southwest Indian Law Clinic, where she
supervises law students who represent Indians in tribal
court criminal proceedings. She has appeared before
1. The parties have consented to the filing of this brief, and
letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk. Pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole
or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No
person other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel made
a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
numerous tribal courts, including the Hopi Criminal
Court, the Pueblo of Tesuque Tribal Court, the Pueblo of
Laguna Tribal Court, the Pueblo of Taos Tribal Court,
and the Tribal Court of the Confederated Tribes of Warm
Springs. She has represented many Indian defendants in
federal habeas court review of tribal court proceedings
pursuant to under 25 U.S.C. § 1303, and has argued before
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.
Amici are concerned about the civil rights and
liberty interests of American Indians in federal court,
and the harmful impact denying the right to counsel has
on Indian defendants in tribal court proceedings and in
subsequent federal court proceedings. Whether disposed
of by plea or trial, federal prosecutions that rely on prior
tribal court convictions that did not provide Indians with
indigent defense counsel gravely jeopardize those Indian
defendants’ federal constitutional rights to due process
of law.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In our American system of justice, the right to counsel
is provided for all defendants when life or liberty is in
the balance, regardless of race, ethnicity, nationality, or
ability to pay. Fundamental due process and this Court’s
precedents require that prior convictions must also
include this fundamental right when offered as proof in
a subsequent prosecution. A prosecutor’s reliance on an
Indian’s prior convictions must be consistent with this
guarantee to reflect the nation’s constitutional values
within the adversarial system.
3The new statutory scheme specifically designed to
combat domestic violence in Indian country reaffirms
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, but also
guarantees that non-Indians have greater rights to due
process and representation by counsel than do Indians
charged with the same crimes and facing the same terms
of incarceration. Indeed, while non-Indian defendants
who will be charged with domestic violence in tribal court
are required to have access to the full panoply of rights
afforded to defendants outside of tribal courts, Indian
defendants may be convicted or led to plead guilty to
charges of domestic violence without the benefit of any
appointed counsel. Compounding this unequal scheme is
the United States’ use of these infirm convictions in federal
court against the Indian in the name of deference to tribal
sovereignty and the federal Indian trust responsibility.
To single out and exclude the Indian defendant from
the fundamental protections celebrated by this Court’s
constitutional jurisprudence is contrary and offensive
to our most basic notions of justice. This constitutional
injury to Indian people is especially grave in light of the
fact that statistically, non-Indians are far more likely to
be the perpetrators of violence against Indian women
than are other Indians, and this was the primary problem
Congress sought to address.
Using uncounseled tribal court convictions in
this way also gravely distorts the deference to tribal
sovereignty that must be afforded by the United States,
and contravenes the federal trust responsibility to tribes
and Indian people. Out of respect for tribal sovereignty
and the financial challenges tribes face in reclaiming their
justice systems in an era of self-determination, Congress
has not yet required tribes to pay for counsel for every
indigent defendant. That was one of the concessions made
in the Indian Civil Rights Act.
However, to exploit the absence of such a right to
counsel in a way that renders Indian peopledand only
Indian people--susceptible to federal prosecution and
incarceration without the advantage of counsel, thereby
removing them from their families and communities,
harms Indians and undermines the collective sovereignty
of tribes. Neither the plenary power doctrine nor the
federal trust responsibility bestows authority on the
United States to do that; and there is no real merit in
the position that protecting the safety of Indian women
requires exacting such an unfair toll on the constitutional
rights of other Indian people. Both the safety and well-
being of women and the basic civil rights of all Native
people within Indian communities can and must be
protected.
Instead of condoning the denigration of Indian civil
rights in federal court, this Court has the opportunity in
this case to extend the protection for individual rights
afforded by the Constitution, so that all persons who face
incarceration, including in tribal court proceedings, have
the right to counsel and full due process. Alternatively,
this Court must, at the very least, protect Indian people
from the grave disparity presented in this litigation by
holding that tribal court convictions of Indians obtained
without the right to counsel cannot be used as an element
in a federal court prosecution.
5ARGUMENT
Reliance on Prior Uncounseled Tribal Court
Convictions to Prove an Element of the Offense
Under 18 U.S.C. § 117 Violates the Due Process
Rights of All American Indian Women, Children
and Men2
A. Constitutional Due Process and the Indian
Civil Rights Act
All defendants in federal court prosecutions have
the right to appointed counsel when life or liberty is in
the balance, regardless of race, ethnicity, or nationality,
and the right to prior convictions that are consistent
with this principle. Allowing prior uncounseled tribal
court convictions to serve as proof of an element of an
offense in federal domestic violence prosecutions violates
the statutory and constitutional due process rights of
American Indians. Whether this Court should allow
reliance on such convictions requires consideration of
the United States Constitution and its application to
American Indians in federal court proceedings. While
an Indian is not constitutionally protected in a tribal
criminal prosecution, she is protected in a federal court
prosecution. Although her citizenship is not relevant to
trigger the full panoply of constitutional protections, she in
fact is a United States citizen, and as such, she is entitled
to all constitutional protections when charged with any
crime in federal court.
2. Allowing prosecutors to credit prior uncounscled tribal
court convictions against Indians will have wide repercussions and
potentially impact American Indian women and men in federal court
proceedings, as well as juveniles who are also subject to federal court
jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act.
6The Constitution establishes the Indian defendant’s
rights in a federal court prosecution, just as it guarantees
these fundamental rights to all U.S. citizens. In particular,
the Constitution guarantees federal criminal defendants
the right to assistance of counsel for their defense. U.S.
Const. Amend. VI. Although there is no Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in tribal court, see Talton v. Mayes, 163
U.S. 376 (1896), constitutional due process and the Indian
Civil Rights Act (ICRA) together ensure that Indians and
non-Indians alike enjoy the right to due process of law in
both tribal court and federal court. U.S. Const. Amend.
V; 25 U.S.C. § 1302 ("No Indian Tribe shall.., deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property
without due process of law .... ").
The United States argues that the absence a right to
appointed counsel in tribal court proceedings, consistent
with the statutory provisions of ICRA, in effect strips
Indians of that right in federal court prosecutions.
Under this view, "valid" convictions under ICRA subject
the Indian to a domestic violence prosecution without
protections deemed necessary to meet fundamental
fairness.
This argument misapprehends both Congress’s intent
in passing ICRA and the inalienability of the federal
constitutional right to counsel that protects Indians and
non-Indians alike when charged with federal crimes
in federal court. Amici urge this Court to reject the
United States’ argument and protect the due process
rights of all American Indians facing prosecution in
federal court. See Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American
Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 Harv. L. Rev.
431,478 (2005) ("If the two primary rights ’missing’ from
ICRA--free representation for indigent defendants and
a jury that includes nonmembers--need to be extended
to somehow save the tribal criminal justice scheme, the
[federal] courts could interpret ICRA’s due process clause
to require both.").
B. Fundamental Fairness and the Right to
Counsel for All When Facing Incarceration
In a commanding line of cases, this Court has defined
the right to counsel as fundamental to justice and fairness
and thus inextricably intertwined with due process. While
the Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due
Process Clauses, the basic elements of a fair trial in
a criminal proceeding are deployed through access to
counsel:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the state and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
U.S. Const. Amend. VI. Thus, a fair trial is one in which
evidence, subject to adversarial testing, is presented to
an impartial tribunal for resolution of elements or ~ssues
defined in advance of the proceeding. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668,685 (1984). Certain safeguards
8are essential to criminal justice, and the right to counsel
is the paramount safeguard. See e.g., Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942).
In federal and state criminal courts, counsel must
be provided for all defendants unable to retain counsel
when life or liberty is in the balance, regardless of race,
ethnicity, or nationality, unless the right is competently
and intelligently waived. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335,339-40 (1963) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938)). Counsel’s presence is essential because attorneys
are the means through which all other rights of a person
on trial are secured. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 653 (1984).
In an oft~quoted passage, this Court has recognized
that without counsel in a criminal matter, the right to be
heard would be utterly meaningless:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases,
of little avail if it did not comprehend the right
to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. If charged with crime,
he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad.
He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant
to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He
lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately
to prepare his defense, even though he has a
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does
not know how to establish his innocence. If that
be true of men of intelligence, how much more
true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those
of feeble intellect.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 68-69 (1932). Involvement of
competent counsel is so central and basic to justice in our
system that an arbitrary denial of counsel is tantamount
to "a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process
in the constitutional sense." Id. at 69. This Court’s view
in Powell of the indispensability of counsel in criminal
proceedings took on enormous and lasting meaning.
Shortly after deciding Powell, this Court in Johnson
v. Zerbst described the right to counsel as "necessary to
insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty," and
the right to counsel guarantee as "one of the essential
barriers against arbitrary or unjust deprivation of human
rights." 304 U.S. at 462; see also Smith v. O’Grady,
312 U.S. 329 (1941); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444
(1940). Johnson v. Zerbst thus directs that the Sixth
Amendment not only guarantees the criminal defendant
a right to retain counsel in federal court, but requires
the government to appoint an attorney for the defendant
who cannot afford one in order to protect her when facing
a government with the power to take her life or liberty:
The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant
admonition that if the constitutional safeguards
it provides be lost, justice will not still be
done. It embodies a realistic recognition of the
10
obvious truth that the average defendant does
not have the professional legal skill to protect
himself when brought before a tribunal with
power to take his life or liberty, wherein the
prosecution is presented by experienced and
learned counsel. That which is simple, orderly,
and necessary to the lawyer-to the untrained
layman-may appear intricate, complex, and
mysterious. Consistently with the wise policy
of the Sixth Amendment and other parts of our
fundamental charter, this Court has pointed
to the humane policy of the modern criminal
law which now provides that a defendant if he
be poor, may have counsel furnished him by
the state, not infrequently more able than the
attorney for the state.
304 U.S. at 463.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, this Court announced a new
constitutional rule, extending the right to court-appointed
counsel to state criminal prosecutions for felony charges,
an extension this Court characterized as structurally
indispensable to a fair trial:
That government hires lawyers to prosecute
and defendants who have the money hire
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications
of the widespread belief that lawyers in
criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.
The right of one charged with crime to counsel
may not be deemed fundamental and essential
to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.
From the very beginning, our state and national
11
constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis
on procedural and substantive safeguards
designed to assure fair trials before impartial
tribunals in which every defendant stands equal
before the law.
372 U.S. at 344. The appointment of counsel for an indigent
criminal defendant is "a fundamental right, essential to
a fair trial," and the Fourteenth Amendment requires
appointment of counsel in a state court, just as the Sixth
Amendment requires it in federal court. Id. at 342-44
(overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)). Gideon
thus affirms that "in our adversary system of criminal
justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire
a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him." Id. at 344.
Nine years after Gideon, this Court in Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), extended the right to
court-appointed counsel to all persons, including Native
Americans, facing the possibility of imprisonment in state
or federal court. Following Argersinger, no person could
be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty,
misdemeanor, or felony, unless she had the assistance
of counsel at trial. See id. at 37; Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.
Importantly, the Indian Civil Rights Act was enacted four
years before this Court’s decision in Argersinger. Thus,
at the time of enactment, ICRA reflected Congress’s
understanding of the minimum protections required by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in state court
proceedings in 1968, prior to Argersinger’s mandate.
When enacting ICRA, Congress ensured that the right to
counsel in tribal court proceedings was synchronous with
the protections then required in state court proceedings.
12
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel serves as a
constitutional minimum in all state and federal criminal
proceedings that may result in a sentence of actual
imprisonment. Tribal courts comprise the only judicial
forum in the United States where the constitutional
right to counsel does not exist for a United States citizen
facing incarceration.3 The lack of appointed counsel and
the imposition of a sentence of actual imprisonment
render the Indian defendant’s convictions constitutionally
invalid. It follows that introduction of uncounseled tribal
court convictions in federal court as proof of an essential
element of a federal crime violates a defendant’s right to
counsel and due process. Any evidence of a prior conviction
that the Government intends to use to "support guilt or
enhance punishment for another offense" in a criminal
proceeding must comport with the protections that the
United States Constitution affords to all--citizens and
non-citizens, Indians and non-Indians alike. Burgett v.
Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1967); see also id. at 115
("The admission of a prior criminal conviction which is
constitutionally infirm under the standards of Gideon v.
Wainwright is inherently prejudicial .... ").
3. Indian Tribes do have to provide counsel at the tribe’s
expenses when imposing a sentence greater than one year and up
to nine years. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (detailing the requirements
imposed for enhanced sentencing under the 2010 Tribal Law and
Order Act amendments to ICRA).
13
II. Reliance on Uncounseled Tribal Court
Convictions Detrimentally Impacts Only Native
American Defendants, Violating Indian People’s
Constitutional Right to Equal Protection
Because of the uneven legal landscape and woeful
jurisdictional gaps, only American Indians show up in
federal court with prior uncounseled convictions that do
not comport with constitutional due process. This calamity
is one created by Congress and this Court’s jurisprudence.
Under the Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362,
385 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006)), federal courts
exercise criminal jurisdiction over American Indians,
yet significant gaps exist respecting jurisdiction over
non-Indians committing serious domestic assault against
Indians on the reservation. When Congress passed the
Indian Civil Rights Act in 1968, tribes retained their
inherent jurisdiction over all criminal offenders, but were
limited by ICRA to sentencing authority equivalent to
a misdemeanor in state or federal court. See 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1303. Moreover, in 1978 this Court in Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), divested
tribes of any jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians.4
Twelve years later, this Court prohibited tribal
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians in Duro
v. Reina, based on concerns about the civil rights of
those citizens. 495 U.S. 676 (1990), rev’d by statute, 25
4. The Oliphant decision has been roundly criticized as judicial
fiat and as "flatly wrong." Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American
Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 431,
457 (2005); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
§4.0213][b], at 228-30 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012)
[hereinafter "COHEN’S HANDBOOK"] (collecting scholars’ criticisms).
14
U.S.C. § 1301(2)(1990). Congress acted swiftly to overrule
Duro, enacting a statute that "recognized and affirmed"
inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over all Indians. 25
U.S.C. § 1301(2)(1990). Although Congress moved quickly
to implement the "Duro fix," it did not attempt to address
the gap in jurisdiction over non-Indians left by Oliphant.
Consequently, tribes were left with limited inherent
criminal jurisdiction over their own Indian membership
as well as members of other tribes; but a jurisdictional
void remained in which non-Indians were totally immune
from tribal court prosecution. That immunity marred
the jurisdictional landscape until Congress acted in
2013 to restore tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians--
but only in domestic violence cases, and contingent on
tribes’ providing certain protections comparable to
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. See
Violence Against Women Act 2013, 127 Star. 120-23, § 904
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304).
Section 904 of the 2013 Act--the Violence Against
Women Act Reauthorization, Pub. L. No. 113-4,
127 Stat. 54 (codified throughout the United States Code)
[hereinafter "VAWA 2013]--contains the Indian country
provisions which allow tribal prosecution of non-Indians
accused of dating violence and domestic abuse. VAWA 2013
represents the first congressional response addressing
this Court’s denial of tribal court jurisdiction in Oliphant.
VAWA 2013 recognizes and affirms "special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction" over non-Indians, as part
of the inherent jurisdiction of Indian tribes defined in the
Indian Civil Rights Act. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1). Because of
VAWA 2013, tribal courts exercising this inherent power
have jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants for acts of
domestic violence or dating violence that occur in the
Indian country of the tribe, but with certain proscriptions.
15
See 25 U.S.C. § 1304 ("Tribal Jurisdiction Over Domestic
Violence").
And herein lies the problem.
Tribes that exercise section 904 jurisdiction must
provide non- Indian defendants with the full panoply of
constitutional rights as established by the U.S. Constitution
and interpreted by this Court, in addition to the ICRA
statutory rights. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(1)-(4). Specifically,
tribes must provide: (1) "all applicable individual rights
guaranteed under [ICRA]"; (2) the right to counsel; (2) an
impartial jury which "reflects a fair cross section of the
community" and does not "systematically exclude" non-
Indians; (3) "all other rights whose protection is necessary
under the Constitution of the United States in order for
Congress to recognize and affirm inherent power [of
tribal courts].., to exercise" this jurisdiction; and (4) for
offenses punishable by imprisonment, all rights described
in 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c).
Accordingly, Indian tribes can only prosecute other
Indians, and under ICRA, Indians do not have the right
to indigent defense counsel. The only exception is the
handful of tribes that are exercising the special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians authorized
by VAWA 2013, which requires the full panoply of U.S.
Constitutional rights. The result is that Indians do not
have the right to indigent defense counsel in tribal court,5
but non-Indians do.5
5. Indians only have the right to indigent defense when facing
a sentence longer than a year. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304.
6. This is especially troubling given the statistics regarding the
number of non-Indians perpetrating violence against Indian women.
16
Tribal court defendants routinely receive and serve
sentences of incarceration without counsel. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kirkaldie, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1108-09
(D. Mont. 2014) (observing that Indian defendant "served
a sentence of actual imprisonment in the tribal court" and
that the "Government concedes that [defendant] failed
to receive appointed counsel in tribal court"); Romero v.
Goodrich, 480 F.App’x 489 (10th Cir. 2012) (challenging
an underlying tribal court order of imprisonment for eight
years without counsel). Thus, in a subsequent federal
prosecution, only a Native American defendant will have
suffered a prior conviction that would have violated the
Constitution and transgressed access to justice principles
applicable in federal court. With respect to Respondent
Bryant, and in most tribal court convictions, the usual
justifications for properly crediting an uncounseled
conviction--such as the sentence having consisted of a
fine only, or an intelligent waiver having been obtained,
or the defendant’s ability to afford counsel--do not apply.
In fact, in Amici’s experience defendants in tribal court
routinely plead guilty to minor offenses and receive
sentences of incarceration without nderstanding their
See Ronet Bachman et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Violence Against
American Indian and Alaska Native Women and the Criminal
Justice Response: What is Known 141 (2008), available at: https://
www.ncjrs, gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/223691.pdf. ("Victimizations
against American Indian and Alaska Native women were more
likely to interracial. That is, a larger percent of victimizations
against American Indian and Alaska Native women are committed
by white offenders compared to American Indian and Alaska Native
offenders.") see also Id. at 38, Table 9. In addition, the report noted
that 60% of Alaska Native and American Indian women resided off
tribal lands in urban areas. Id. at 6, 17.
17
rights or the collateral consequences of a conviction with
jail time imposed.~ Nor is there merit in the argument
7. See Statement of Neil Fulton, Chief Federal Public Defender
for the Districts of North and South Dakota Before the Senate
Judiciary Committee on Protecting the Constitutional Rights to
Counsel of Indigents Charged with Misdemeanors, May 13, 2015.
Mr. Fuller testified:
"Entering guilty pleas to get out of tribal custody is a disturbing
and recurring reality that encounter. Many tribes do not provide
counsel and many that allow counsel permit lay advocates rather
than law trained ones. When a defendant requests counsel, they
often face the reality that due to case backlogs, the lack of readily
available counsel given sparse populations, and other practical
impediments they will remain in jail longer to obtain counsel and
fight a charge than if they simply pleaded guilty and got a sentence
of time served. In my experience that is common. In fact, I have
spoken with advocates who have dealt with the conflict of advising
clients who may want to assert their innocence and use counsel, but
would face extended detention to do so and simply plead guilty as a
result of not understanding how those admissions may be harmful
in the future.
"I also frequently see prosecution for domestic assault by
an habitual offender under 18 U.S.C. Section 117 based on tribal
misdemeanor assault convictions that are obtained without counsel.
While there are clearly many instances of real and troubling domestic
abuse in Indian Country and elsewhere, there are also many
instances where conduct that would more accurately be described
as public intoxication or disorderly conduct results in a guilty plea
to domestic violence in tribal court without counsel. Later, those
uncounseled tribal court convictions provide the foundation for
federal prosecution and enhanced penalties."
Protecting the Constitutional Right to Counsel for Indigents
Charged with Misdemeanors: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
On the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015)(statement of Neil Fulton, Chief
18
that Congress’s intent to accommodate tribal sovereignty
by not requiring defense counsel at the tribe’s expense
licenses disregard or suspension of the Constitution’s
protections when the Indian defendant is haled into federal
court. Although this Court has held that the Constitution’s
due process safeguards against governmental power
do not apply of their own force to tribal governments,
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), the power of the
federal government is not likewise exempt and remains
constitutionally limited. This Court must not sanction the
racially offensive notion that the Constitution does not
fully protect a criminal defendant in federal court when
she happens to be an Indian whose tribal enrollment status
had allowed her to be convicted previously in tribal court
without benefit of counsel.
While it is true that the Sixth Amendment does not
operate to require counsel in tribal court, it does not follow
that convictions secured without counsel and adequate
civil rights protections are sovereign tribal decisions to be
credited in federal court at the expense of the individual
Indian defendant. There are myriad reasons for a tribe’s
decision not to provide law-trained counsel in tribal
court proceedings, including the all-too-common lack of
financial resources, training, and personnel to support a
tribal public defense system on an impoverished Indian
reservation. Those reasons do not alter the fact (or soften
the harsh reality) that the prior convictions were secured
without protections this Court repeatedly has deemed
Federal Public Defender for the Districts of North and South
Dakota), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/
protecting-the-constitutional-right-to-counsel-for-indigentso
charged-with-misdemeanors.
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necessary to provide basic fairness in federal court
proceedings. There are also myriad reasons that a tribal
judge would routinely impose a jail sentence for minor
offenses on the reservation, including lack of alternatives
to incarceration, recidivism and probation violations for
substance abuse, and limited access to treat substance
abuse on the reservation.
Even assuming that congressional plenary power
over Indian tribes allows Congress to create a federal
offense aimed at combatting domestic violence in Indian
country, crediting a prior uncounseled conviction to make
it easier for the prosecutor to convict the Indian does not
fall within that power. In determining whether Congress
intended to permit prior uncounseled convictions to
serve as proof of the element of the domestic violence
statute, this Court’s longstanding interpretive canons of
construction in both Indian law and criminal law weigh
heavily in favor of retaining protection of the individual
Indian and her constitutional rights in federal court. See,
e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK §2.02, supra, at 113-23 (discussing
Indian law canons). The broader, long-term danger posed
by this case, of course, is that if Congress can diminish
the civil rights of an Indian individual in federal court for
the sole purpose of making it easier to convict, it can do
so for other citizens as well.s
The use of prior uncounseled convictions to combat
domestic violence in federal court creates an untenable
8. "Like the miner’s canary, the Indian marks the shifts from
fresh air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment
of Indians... reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith."
Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-53, 62 Yale L.J.
348,390 (1953).
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and unconscionable equal protection problem for Native
Americans, whose unique racial/political status targets
them as the only class of United States citizens who face
prosecution with priors that were secured without the
fundamental fairness equated with the right to counsel.9
Domestic violence is a plague that threatens all families
and has a documented toll on Indians in Indian country.
The United States has taken the position that suspending
an Indian defendant’s constitutionally protected rights
in federal court is the only way to address domestic
violence problems in Indian country. As interpreted by the
United States in this case, Section 117(a) deprives a certain
class of citizens--based on their race, ethnic origin, and
political status--of those citizens’ constitutional right
to have counsel appointed to defend themselves against
charges of criminal wrongdoing. The Government’s effort
to evade the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee by
arguing that tribal status constitutes a political rather
than racial distinction must be rejected in the context of
criminal prosecutions in federal court. The Constitution is
equally available to all U.S. citizens--American Indians
included--to defend themselves against the immense
prosecutorial power of the Federal Government.
9. This Court has held that classifications based on status
as a member of a recognized Indian tribe do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641,644-47
(1977). However, Antelope specifically left open the question of
whether "instances in which Indians tried in federal court are
subjected to differing penalties and burdens of proof from those
applicable to non-Indians charged with the same offense" would
violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 649 n. 11. Such a scenario
is present here.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, amici urge this Court
to affirm the decision Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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APPENDIX -- STATEMENTS OF I NTERESTS OF
PARTICULAR AMICI CURIAE*
The following join as Sponsors of the Brief of Barbara
Creel and the Tribal Defender Network as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondent:*
ANDREA SEIELSTAD
Professor Andrea M. Seielstad has 25 years of experience
representing individuals in tribal court proceedings,
as well as in state, federal and administrative courts of
Ohio and New Mexico. She began her legal career as a
staff attorney at DNA - People’s Legal Services, Inc.,
in Crownpoint, New Mexico, providing public defender
services for adults and juveniles charged with crimes
by the Navajo Nation and representing individuals in a
variety of civil proceedings. She has represented Native
Americans in habeas actions in tribal and state court and
collaborated in the representation of Indian defendants
in federal habeas court review of tribal court orders
pursuant to 25 U.S. C 1303. She is a tenured professor at
the University of Dayton School of Law, where she teaches
in and directs the school’s clinical program and teaches
civil procedure, civil rights enforcement, and dispute
resolution. She also teaches and supervises students
periodically in the University of New Mexico’s Southwest
Indian Law Clinic and has taught as a visiting professor in
a clinical program that acted as the public defender of the
Nez Perce Tribal Court at the University of Idaho School
of Law. She is licensed to practice in Ohio, New Mexico,
the Bishop Paiute Tribal Court, and has practiced before
the Navajo Nation courts.
* Titles and affiliations are for identification purposes only.
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Professor Seielstad is committed to protecting the civil
and human rights of American Indians as well as in
promoting tribal sovereignty. Based on her experience
representing individuals in tribal, state, and federal
court, she has experienced first-hand the importance of
counsel in advising individuals about the consequences of
their pleas in and outside of tribal justice systems and in
securing due process and other fundamental rights.
KATHLEEN BOWMAN
Kathleen Bowman is the Director Office of Navajo Public
Defender Office, a position she has held since the office
was established in 1999. She manages and supervises the
criminal defense services at the Window Rock office and
three district offices within the Navajo Nation. As the
Tribal Public Defender, she represents the defense bar in
drafting and revising the Navajo Nation code - including
the Children’s Code, Family Violence and Protection Act,
Vulnerable Adult Protection Act, Extradition Statutes,
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Title 17
Criminal Statutes - providing a voice and critique that is
crucial to ensuring due process rights and fundamental
rights are protected. She is a dedicated advocate for
justice and fairness in criminal proceedings, and has
spoken out on pre-trial detention abuses that cause
uncounseled pleas, http://www.navajotimes.com/politics/
lawcourts/2010/0410/042910defendants.php
Ms. Bowman is a member of the Tribal Defender Network.
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ELLEN PITCHER
Ellen C. Pitcher served as an Assistant Federal Public
Defender in the District of Oregon for 24 years, where
she was a Senior Litigator for the last decade of her
service. She has represented dozens of tribal members
charged with offenses in Indian Country, including
murder, manslaughter, felony assault, sexual offenses
and firearms charges. In this capacity, she traveled to
a number of reservation lands, observed tribal court
proceedings and met with tribal prosecutors, probation
officers, legal aid personnel and law enforcement. Prior
to her federal service, she headed criminal law practice
in Hood River and Wasco counties along the Columbia
River in Oregon, where she represented tribal members
in state criminal proceedings. Her interest in tribal
legal issues extends beyond individual cases, and she has
traveled to the Confederal Tribes of the Warm Springs
Indian Reservation to meet with tribal council members,
provide general legal information to the local newspaper,
the Spilyay Tymoo, and mentor the tribal advocates and
legal aid attorneys representing tribal members in tribal
court.
Ms. Pitcher’s path to the legal profession began with her
advocacy for women’s rights in the 1970’s, and she remains
committed to the fight for women’s civil rights, including
their safety from domestic violence, both in Indian County
and elsewhere. Her concern for tribal members includes
protection of individual tribal members’ fundamental
constitutional rights in tribal court and in subsequent
proceedings in state and federal court.
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KRISTY BARRETT
Kristy Barrett is the former Executive Director of
the Native American Program of Legal Aid Society of
Oregon, an organization she worked with for over 16 years,
before becoming the Executive Director of Sage Legal
Center, a nonprofit law firm dedicated to Indian juvenile
justice. At the Native American Program, she managed
a Department of Justice criminal defense contract and
supervised a tribal court criminal defense services on the
Warm Springs Indian Reservation and provided defense
training and services to coordinated to address the gap
in justice for tribal people under the Indian Civil Rights
Act. The tribal public defense cases provided numerous
opportunities to view the necessity of counsel and the
degradation of Indian rights without it.
OFFICE OF THE TRIBAL PUBLIC DEFENDER
COLVILLE CONFEDERATED TRIBES
The Office of the Tribal Public Defender for the Colville
Confederated Tribes is one of the few dedicated criminal
defense offices in Indian Country. Neither the Indian
Civil Rights Act nor the Colville Civil Rights Act require
the tribes to pay for members to be represented, however
the Colville Business Council has chosen to do so to better
serve the membership. Pursuant to the tribal code, public
defenders and advocates represent members in criminal
cases in which defendants are facing jail. Certain Colville
public defenders and advocates are members of the Tribal
Defense Network.
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REINA ESTIMO
Reina Estimo is a member of the Confederated Tribes
of Warm Springs, a federally recognized Indian Tribe
in Oregon, and a former Tribal Public Defense Lay
Advocate with the Tribes. In her position, Ms. Estimo has
provided criminal defense services to hundreds of Warm
Springs Tribal members in tribal court. She is concerned
with the due process rights of all Indians in tribal, state
and federal court proceeding, including the direct and
collateral consequences of a tribal court conviction. She
has witnessed the harsh reality of crime and punishment
in Indian Country where indigent Indian defendants,
tribal members and non-members - men, women and
children -were incarcerated in the reservation jail for up
to year or more without any representation. Many Indians
entered a guilty plea without any legal advice from counsel
or an advocate, or even information on the nature of the
charges and evidence, because of the inability to post
any bail on pending charges. Without the possibility of
bail, defendants plead guilty to expedite the process to
begin a serving sentence rather than wait several weeks
or months in pre-trial detention. She has also witnessed
non-member Indians plead without any advice because
they are unable to retain counsel and were not entitled to
the tribal defender services. Ms. Estimo was a member
of the Tribal Defender Network.
JOHN P. LAVELLE
Professor LaVelle has been teaching and writing in the
field of Indian law for 22 years. He is an enrolled member
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of the Santee Sioux Nation and an Associate Justice of
the Santee Sioux Nation Supreme Court. He served as a
member of the board of authors and executive editors for
the 2005 and 2012 editions of Cohen’s Handbook of Federal
Indian Law, the field’s comprehensive treatise. He is a
Dickason Professor Law at the University of New Mexico
School of Law in Albuquerque, where he teaches courses
in the Law and Indigenous Peoples Program.
